The Missing Link: Direct Effect, CETA/TIIP and Investor-State-Dispute Settlement by Thym, Daniel
The Missing Link: Direct Effect,
CETA/TIIP and Investor-State-Dispute
Settlement
Daniel Thym 2015-01-04T10:28:44
International treaties have rarely received more attention than the proposed free
trade deals with the US and Canada. This entails that many law students and
practitioners are confronted with a theme that does not feature prominently in
legal education. In debates with students, I realise that preconceptions about the
functioning of domestic legal systems are regularly projected upon the international
sphere. One example are demands that companies should challenge state action
before domestic courts instead of dispute settlement bodies under TTIP and CETA.
These claims often assume that national courts hold the competence to enforce
corresponding rules. For lawyers working on domestic issues it seems self-evident
that courts can apply the law.
Against this background, this blogpost focuses on a provision in the Draft CETA
with Canada, whose relevance has not been acknowledged so far, including by
the stimulating contributions to the Verfassungsblog Symposium on Investment
Protection. On page 470 of the roughly 1600 pages of the consolidated CETA
Draft Agreement, which the Commission regards as a template for free trade
negotiations with the United States, we come across a final provision of seemingly
minor relevance on ‘private rights’, which rejects the applicability of the agreement
en passant. This reaffirms that the implications of the free trade deals would be less
dramatic than some suggest.
Background: CETA and TTIP as International EU
Agreements
In order to understand the relevance of Article 14.14 on private rights, we should
apprehend that most segments of the free trade agreements would be binding
upon Member States as an integral part of EU law. Axel Flessner may try to argue
that the arrangements would constitute an ultra-vires-act (thereby initiating more
tweets than any other contribution to the said symposium), but the plain Treaty text
demonstrates that the legal picture is fairly evident. Article 207 TFEU declares that
the Common Commercial Policy allows for the conclusion of trade agreements on
goods and services and embraces, among others, ‘foreign direct investment’, while
Article 3 TEU maintains that the conclusion of corresponding agreements shall be an
exclusive Union competence.
These provisions were a deliberate policy choice after decades of wrangles about
the precise scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The Treaty of Lisbon
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was meant to replace earlier and ambiguous formulations with an overarching
competence for the European Union. In its Lisbon Judgment, the German Federal
Constitutional Court recognised the pertinence of this change: ‘With the exclusive
competence as set out above, the Union acquires the sole power of disposition over
international trade agreements which may result in an essential reorganisation of
the internal order of the Member States.’ Judges in Karlsruhe gave the green light
to the changes nonetheless, albeit with a minor caveat that ‘much argues in favour
of assuming that the term “foreign direct investment” only encompasses investment
which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an enterprise’ and excluded so-called
portfolio investments as a result.
This reference to the limits of the CCP is relevant, since it indicates, in general
terms, that there remain uncertainties about the precise delimitation of competences
for corollary aspects of international trade. For that reason, most national
governments maintain that CETA and TTIP should be concluded as so-called ‘mixed
agreements’, with the EU and all 28 EU Member States as signatories. If that view
prevailed, national parliaments would have to give their consent as well. However,
this would not modify the internal allocation of powers; the EU institutions are in the
driving seat in the vast field of Union competence – both during the negotiations
and with regard to legal effects. It is established case law that the legal effects of
mixed agreements follow the rules of Union law for all matters that are covered by
the Common Commercial Policy.
Domestic Application of Agreements concluded by
the EU
The predominance of Union law in legal practice can obscure our awareness for the
specificities of the international legal system. Law students across Europe learn in
their undergraduate courses about the direct and supreme effect of supranational
rules, but are not always familiar with public international law. Domestic courts have
to apply Union law in pretty much the same was as national law, but this assumption
cannot be extended to public international law without modification, including in
situations in which the EU concludes international agreements with third states.
It is true that the ECJ maintains that international agreements can have direct
effect as an integral part of the Union legal order – and an example demonstrates
that this can have critical implications: judges in Luxembourg decided in July that
Member States cannot automatically require the spouses of Turkish nationals to
acquire basic language skills of the host country. Legally, this conclusion rests
upon an interpretation of the so-called standstill provision for the self-employed
in the Additional Protocol of 1970 to the Association Agreement between Turkey
and today’s European Union. In the terminology of international trade law, the case
concerned a so-called non-tariff barrier to the freedom of establishment. It is these
non-tariff barriers that take centre stage in both CETA and TTIP negotiations (both
will not affect migration, though).
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If the underlying legal arguments about direct effect and court jurisdiction extended
to free trade deals with Canada and the United States, the implications could be
dramatic indeed. Both the ECJ and domestic courts would hold the power to correct
domestic or supranational legislation, whenever it falls foul of CETA or TTIP. Yet,
this outcome is no foregone conclusion, since the ECJ opts for a direct applicability
of international agreements ‘only where the nature and the broad logic of the latter
do not preclude this.’ In deciding whether this is the case, it considers, among
others, the purpose of the agreement, the will of the parties and the question of
reciprocity, i.e. whether the Union would be alone in recognising direct effect.
Luxembourg may have largely ignored the question of reciprocity with regard to
Turkey and other neighbours, but it traditionally takes centre stage in the evaluation
of trade liberalisation agreements.
Article 14.14 of the CETA Draft Treaty
Once we have understood the far-reaching implications of direct applicability, we
may appreciate the bearing of the clause on private rights in the final provisions of
the consolidated Draft CETA Agreement, which states: ‘Nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than
those created between the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting
this Agreement to be directly invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties.’
That is nothing less than the official denial of direct effect in the operative treaty text;
neither the ECJ nor domestic courts would hold the power to apply CETA rules in
domestic proceedings or to annul legislation, which contradicts trade law. CETA and
TTIP would get the same treatment that the ECJ accords to WTO law, which also
does not have direct effect in the EU legal order and the domestic legal systems
of the Member States – not even in situations, in which the appellate body of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism confirmed that EU legislation falls foul of WTO
standards.
Denial of direct effect is an important stumbling block for the long-term success of
any free trade agreement, especially when it comes to the elimination of non-tariff
barriers to trade, since corresponding rules are often formulated in an open manner.
The real-life implications of such vaguely formulated provisions depends decisively
upon the continued will of the parties and the availability of control and enforcement
mechanisms – as the experience with non-tariff barriers to trade in the EU single
market and the example of language requirements for spouses of Turkish nationals
demonstrate. Without institutional control mechanism, vague treaty formulations are
often ineffective.
Implications for the Debate about Investor-State-
Dispute Settlement
In the light of Article 14.14 of the CETA Draft Agreement, we may have to re-
consider our perspective on the proposed investor-state-dispute settlement rules
in both CETA and TTIP. Critics will use the absence of direct application as an
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argument to decry the special treatment for investors; supporters, by contrast, will
argue with the Commission that the dispute settlement bodies are a compensation
for domestic legal remedies, which would not be available for the substantive rules
of CETA and TTIP. I personally share the opinion of Christian Tams that the debate
should focus on the desirability of special rules for investors (and not the question
of procedure). The latter may be superfluous in relations with the US and Canada,
but to abandon them would render it difficult to insist upon similar provisions in
negotiations with China, Russia or other states we trust less.
In any case, the absence of direct effect in domestic proceedings shows that
the legal implications of CETA and TIIP would be less dramatic than some
commentators in the public debate suggest. Courts in Europe would not hold the
power to annul domestic or supranational legislation, which violates the agreements
– a power that also the dispute settlement bodies would be denied explicitly, together
with the option for the state parties to force their reading of the agreements upon the
arbiters by means of an authoritative interpretation. This would orientate the dispute
settlement rules in CETA and TTIP towards inter-state bargaining, pretty much like in
the WTO context.
The denial of direct application demonstrates that both the CETA Draft Agreement
and the TTIP negotiation position are far removed from resembling anything like
EU-style integration through law – and I consider this to be a good thing given
that any dynamic interpretation would lack much of the democratic legitimacy
and procedural constraints, which we have, notwithstanding all the deficits, in
the European context. It seems to me that it is the biggest benefit of the debate
about CETA and TTIP to this date that the broader public has started discussing
the governance of economic globalisation. That debate will stay with us, even if
an seemingly unimpressive provision on page 470 of the CETA Draft Agreement
excludes the domestic enforcement of the transatlantic trade rules.
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